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Regulation consists of both formulating policies and designing mecha-
nisms to implement those policies. Much attention has been focused on the
desirability and formulation of socially efficient policies.' However, pro-
posals for regulatory reform often assume that policies, once designed, will
function faultlessly.' In fact, there are often significant obstacles to effi-
ciency in implementing public policy, because government agencies
charged with policy implementation do not have the correct economic
incentives. Although the social costs and benefits of government programs
are greatly affected by the set of rules used to implement them, little
attention has been devoted to designing mechanisms to efficiently imple-
ment these programs.
The distinction between the efficiency of rules used to implement a pol-
icy and the efficiency of the policy itself is illustrated by the "offset pol-
icy" 8 of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-a system of mar-
ketable air pollution rights generally thought to be an economically
efficient means to protect the environment.4 Under the offset policy, a new
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1. A policy is a social decision to regulate a certain activity. A rule is the method used to imple-
ment the policy. In the context of government regulation, an efficient policy maximizes the difference
between the social benefits and costs of the policy. An efficient regulation will be defined here as one
that attains the social goal established by policymakers and does so at the least cost.
2. One commentator has noted that "policy studies rarely raise, and almost never answer such
questions as who would have to do what, and when, and with what foreseeable resistance, modifica-
tions, and compromises if alternative A were chosen, or B, or C ...." Wolf, A Theory of
Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 132 (1979)
(emphasis in original).
3. See Air Quality Standards Interpretive Ruling, 40 C.F.R. § 51, app. S (1985).
4. Although the offset policy does not establish a widespread and robust market in pollution
rights, it does represent a limited step in that direction. See Note, A Remedy for the Victims of Pollu-
tion Permit Markets, 92 YALE L.J. 1022, 1025 n.21 (1983). Many writers have advocated marketable
pollution rights as an economically efficient means of environmental protection. See, e.g., B.
ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 260-81 (1974); W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 250-53 (1979); J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND
PRICES 93-97 (1968); Hahn & Noll, Designing a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits, in
REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 119, 120-23 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
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firm wishing to pollute in an area of the country that is not yet in compli-
ance with relevant national ambient air quality standards5 is required to
obtain an offsetting reduction in emissions from some other source of pol-
lution in the region.6 Implementation of the offset policy requires a very
detailed set of rules governing the initial allocation of rights, the transfer
of such rights, the method for resolving disputes between buyers and sell-
ers of rights, and the techniques for measuring pollution. There is evi-
dence that the implementation of the offset policy by EPA has been far
from efficient.7 One study found that all but thirty-five of the 1000 offset
permits issued in the four years following adoption of the policy were
intrafirm offsets, whereby a firm reduced pollution at one of its existing
plants in order to increase its emissions at a new facility.' The disap-
pointing results were attributed to such barriers as measurement
problems, administrative transaction costs, and comparability of pollu-
tants, geographic location, and timing.'
The problems encountered in implementing marketable pollution rights
are endemic to all areas of policy implementation because the government
agencies charged with developing and enforcing regulations do not have
incentives to do so in an economically efficient manner. In addition to
choosing efficient policies, therefore, Congress should institute efficient
enforcement mechanisms."' This article argues that significant social bene-
fits will result from transferring responsibility for implementing public
policy from government regulatory agencies to private parties with eco-
nomic incentives to develop and enforce regulations in an efficient
manner.
11
Shifting the enforcement of public policy to private enforcement agents
will result in efficiency gains for at least three reasons. First, private firms
are generally more efficiently operated than public agencies. 2 Second,
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1985).
6. 40 C.F.R. § 51, app. S (1985).
7. See Roberts, Some Problems of Implementing Marketable Pollution Rights Schemes: The Case
of the Clean Air Act, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 4, at 93.
8. Id. at 98.
9. Id. at 97-104. For example, EPA had originally decided that even after receiving state
approval, each offset request would have to be approved in normal administrative proceedings, includ-
ing public hearings. Id. at 97.
10. This article does not address the normative issue of whether a given policy should be
implemented.
11. Others have argued for the privatization of some public services. E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR: HOW TO SHRINK GOVERNMENT (1982); Savas, Local Government: Public Versus
Private Refuse Collection, 3 POL'Y. ANALYSIS 49 (1977); Spann, Public vs. Private Provision of
Government Services, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENTAL
GROWTH (T. Borcherding ed. 1977); Pashigian, Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of
Urban Transit Facilities, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1239 (1976). These discussions focus on the provision of
services rather than on policy implementation.
12. See infra note 68.
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Congress is better equipped to choose the correct type of enforcement
agent and to endow it with appropriate property rights than it is to choose
the correct rules for implementation. 8 Third, and most important, private
enforcement agents, unlike government regulators, will possess ongoing
economic interests directly related to the costs and benefits of public policy
implementation.14
This article is organized into four parts. Part I discusses the problems
currently encountered in the implementation of public policy by govern-
ment agencies. Part II details a proposal for shifting the responsibility for
implementation of public policy to the private sector, using the examples
of automobile safety and pollution control to demonstrate how a system of
private enforcement could be structured. Part III discusses the efficiency
gains that are likely to result from private enforcement of public policy.
Finally, Part IV anticipates and rebuts some of the criticisms which may
arise in response to this proposal.
I. Inefficient Implementation by Government Regulators
Economists long ago recognized that government regulators lack incen-
tives to adopt economically efficient regulations.' 5 Although there is dis-
agreement about how to model regulators' objectives, few economists
believe that social welfare maximization motivates bureaucratic behav-
ior. 6 One theory of bureaucratic behavior is that utility maximization on
the part of individual bureaucrats leads to budget maximization rather
than to efficient regulation.' 7 Budget maximization, or, more precisely,
13. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., G. TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1965); A. DOWNS, INSIDE
BUREAUCRACY (1967). Downs observes that "society cannot insure that it will be served merely by
assigning someone to serve it." Id. at 87.
16. For critical reviews of the "public interest" theory of government regulation, see R. NOLL,
REFORMING REGULATION 33-46 (1971); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974). According to Noll, "the traditional theory of regulation is based on the
view that the regulatory process is efficient and perfectible. According to this view, regulatory ineffec-
tiveness arises from various externally imposed difficulties, such as coercion by politicians, improper
structure of the agency, a bad legislative mandate, or inadequate means for obtaining information,
general political support, and coordination with other agencies." Id. at 39. Noll suggests as an alter-
native that "inherent in the regulatory process is a persistent tendency to make socially undesirable
policy, even if the agency is motivated to 'do good' rather than to promote the regulated industry." Id.
at 40. But cf. McFadden, Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Theory, 6 BELL J.
ECON. 401 (1975); McFadden, Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evi-
dence, 7 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1976). Analyzing the freeway routes selected by the California Division
of Highways from 1958 to 1966, this study found that the Division of Highways acted as if it
attempted to maximize economic net benefits in its selection of routes. However, the study did not
address the issue of whether the bureaucracy expended a socially optimal amount of its own resources
in selecting the routes-that is, whether a private enforcement agent might have been able to achieve
the same selection of routes at a lower cost.
17. See W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); Niskanen,
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discretionary budget maximization,is is the logical goal of a utility maxi-
mizing bureaucrat who has some control over information and the
bureaucracy's agenda" and whose utility depends on both income and the
non-pecuniary benefits of the position. Budget maximization holds that
the bureaucrat, controlling much of the information about the subject of
the regulation, can convince the legislature to approve a budget larger
than necessary to achieve the bureaucracy's regulatory goals, thus result-
ing in an inefficient use of resources. Several reforms have been proposed
to overcome this inherent problem, including establishing competing agen-
cies and awarding bureaucrats a share of cost-saving innovations.20 Unfor-
tunately, many of these proposals are of limited applicability or, at least,
have not been widely implemented."
A competing theory of regulation holds that government regulators are
"political support maximizers." 2 The political support maximization the-
ory assumes that regulators wish to maximize support, taking into account
both the winners and losers resulting from their actions. Since the regula-
tor has a certain amount of discretion in acting, he or she will act to
balance the support gained by a given action against that lost. Thus, for
example, the price regulator may decide to set prices that vary across loca-
tions or consumer groups, hoping to maximize support by maintaining the
highest possible price while at the same time minimizing consumer oppo-
sition "by exploiting differences among them in per capita wealth or the
Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617 (1975). Niskanen illustrates the rationality of
bureaucratic budget maximization by considering the likely consequences of behaving otherwise:
Consider the probable consequences for a subordinate manager who proves without question
that the same output could be produced at, say, one-half the present expenditures. In a profit-
seeking firm this manager would probably receive a bonus, a promotion, and an opportunity to
find another such economy . . . [11n a bureau, at best, the manager might receive a citation
and a savings bond, a lateral transfer, the enmity of his former colleagues, and the suspicion of
his new colleagues.
W. NISKANEN, supra, at 38 n.7.
18. See Niskanen, supra note 17. Niskanen defines the discretionary budget as the difference
between "the maximum budget that would be approved by the government review group . . . [and]
the minimum cost of producing the output of the bureau." Id. at 619.
19. See, e.g., Romer & Rosenthal, Bureaucrats vs. Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource
Allocation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q.J. ECON. 143 (1979); Romer & Rosenthal, Political Resource
Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1978).
20. See W. Niskanen, supra note 17, at 195-212.
21. For example, Niskanen proposes that political appointees be permitted to appropriate a por-
tion of any cost savings from the level of expenditures originally budgeted for a program. W.
NISKANEN, supra note 17, at 201-04. However, this would only work in a competitive environment
where other bureaus can compete to provide the service. Otherwise, the government employee could
simply overstate the amount required to perform the service in order to maximize the "cost savings."
Athough he advocates increased competition among bureaus, Niskanen readily admits that regulatory
reforms have generally consolidated competing bureaus in an attempt to eliminate duplication. Id. at
195-201.
22. See Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 371 (1983); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
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responsiveness of wealth to taxes ...or in their voting sensitivity to
taxes."28  This theory has different implications than the budget max-
imization model," ' but it also suggests that efficient regulation will be the
exception rather than the rule.
Recent empirical analyses illustrate how inefficient implementation can
occur, independent of the efficiency or inefficiency of the underlying pol-
icy. A study of the Federal Reserve Board, for example, found a positive
relation between the size of the monetary base and the size of the Federal
Reserve Board as measured by number of employees.2 5 Since expansion-
ary monetary policy allows the agency to hire additional workers, budget
maximization suggests that one motivation for expansionary monetary
policy is the growth in the agency's budget resulting from the increased
number of employees. 6 If true, this indicates inefficiency in implementing
monetary policy, as the Federal Reserve Board will prefer a budget
greater than that required to fulfill its regulatory agenda.
Another example of inefficient implementation can be found in the reg-
ulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
response to the 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.
27
The Amendments authorized the FDA to require "proof of efficacy" for
23. Peltzman, supra note 22, at 219. The political support maximization hypothesis is related to
the "capture" theory of regulation. Traditional capture theory holds that regulatory agencies were
formed to promote the public interest and were later "captured" by the regulated party. This notion
was rejected by George Stigler, who instead postulated that agencies are in fact formed to confer
benefits on those who are regulated. Stigler, supra note 22. Stigler argues that the bureaucrat will
confer benefits on one interest group-that which is most easily organized and which has the most to
gain. This has been refined to suggest that there may in fact be more than one winner and one loser
resulting from bureaucratic behavior. Peltzman, supra note 22, at 219.
One of the unresolved issues of regulatory behavior is whether agencies operate independently of
the legislature. Implicit in the budget maximization and political support maximization hypotheses is
the regulator's ability to exercise discretionary authority. However, there is evidence that Congress in
fact exerts a significant amount of control over the agency decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Weingast
& Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
24. The different implications of the budget maximization and political support maximization
hypotheses are illustrated in Cooter & Topakian, Political Economy of a Public Corporation: Pricing
Objectives of BART, 13 J. PuB. ECON. 299 (1980). Cooter and Topakian analyzed the pricing deci-
sions of the board of directors of San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART). They
first hypothesized that BART's fare structure is chosen to maximize total passenger miles travelled on
BART and total farebox collections in order to maximize BART's budget and size. They then posited
alternatively that BART's managers adjust fares to maximize political support. Cooter and Topakian
found that pricing subsidies were a function of trip length, not of the socioeconomic characteristics of
the riders, which corresponds to the predictions of the budget maximization hypothesis.
25. Shughart & Tollison, Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve
System, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1983).
26. Although they acknowledge that budget maximization does not fully explain historical money
supply values, Shughart and Tollison argue that "bureaucratic incentives play a role in the formula-
tion of monetary policy and perhaps explain in part the Fed's apparent inflationary bias." Id. at 291.
27. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.)
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new drugs before they could be marketed to consumers. One study found
evidence that the FDA's implementation of the 1962 Amendments
resulted in a net loss to society. 8 For example, the FDA's rules for testing
new drugs and its lengthy review process resulted in delays of up to sev-
eral years for the introduction of many effective drugs. 9 These findings
are not surprising given that the FDA has no incentive to determine the
socially efficient level of government intervention in the testing process.
The political support maximization theory has been used to model
enforcement by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) of its industrial work safety rules. In addition to finding OSHA's
health and safety regulations generally inefficient, one study demonstrated
that OSHA's enforcement of health and safety regulations favors large,
unionized firms at the expense of small, non-unionized firms.30 This may
be evidence of over-enforcement against small firms, under-enforcement
against large firms, or both. In any case, this apparent political support
maximization is inconsistent with efficient implementation of public policy
by regulators considering only the social costs and benefits of enforcing
regulations.
There is also evidence that government bureaucracies are often unable
to monitor adequately compliance with their own regulations. For exam-
ple, a recent study by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce found that EPA's monitoring of hazardous waste dump
sites is "inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable."'" The study found that
although twenty-five percent of the sites had inadequate wells more than
three years after they should have been in compliance with EPA regula-
tions, 2 EPA in over half the cases either had taken no action or had only
sent informal warnings. 8
28. See Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amend-
ments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973).
29. See W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 55-107 (1975)
(discussing the effect on the drug market of the FDA's implementation of the 1962 Amendments).
30. Bartel & Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact,
28 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1985).
31. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., lST SESs., GROUNDWATER MONITORING SURVEY 1 (Comm. Print 1985).
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 3. See also Atkinson, Tainted Ground Water Indicated at 559 Dumps, Wash. Post,
Apr. 29, 1985, at A4, col. 5. There is growing interest in the extent to which agencies use their
discretion in deciding how much enforcement they will undertake. See, e.g., Epple & Visscher, Envi-
ronmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection and Deterrence, 27 J.L. & ECON. 29 (1984);
Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983).
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II. A Proposal for Private Enforcement
The budget maximization and political support maximization hypothe-
ses argue that under the present regulatory system, government regulators
lack economic incentives to adopt efficient regulations. However, the
means may exist to create the correct incentives for efficient policy imple-
mentation. This section outlines the theoretical basis for proposing that
the responsibility for enforcing public policy be shifted to the private sec-
tor and provides two examples of how such a program might be
implemented.
A. Evolution of Efficient Regulations
Ronald Coase argued in his seminal article that, assuming the absence
of transaction costs, parties with property rights in valuable resources will
allocate these resources efficiently among themselves."' According to
Coase, rules concerning the initial allocation of property rights do not
matter because parties will have incentives to trade until an efficient allo-
cation is reached." No outside interference is required to enforce this
result as long as the property rights can be clearly defined so that parties
will have a base from which to bargain."
34. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
35. While the initial allocation of property rights will not affect the efficiency of outcomes where
there are no transaction costs, the Coase theorem will have distributional effects. To use the example
provided in note 36, infra, a farmer possessing a property right in crop safety will be better off than if
a property right in the ability to emit sparks were granted initially to the railroad.
36. As an example of the likely operation of the Coase theorem in a world of low transaction
costs, consider the discussion in R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) of the
example involving a railroad whose trains emit sparks and a farmer whose land is subject to fire
damage from the sparks:
Suppose that the right to emit sparks, by enabling the railroad to dispense with costly spark-
arresting equipment, would increase the value of its property by $100 but reduce the value of
the farmer's property by $50 because it would prevent him from growing crops close to the
tracks. If the farmer has a legal right to be free from engine sparks, the railroad presumably
will offer to pay, and the farmer will accept, compensation for the surrender of his right. Since
the right to prevent spark emissions is worth only $50 to the farmer but imposes costs on the
railroad of $100, a sale of the farmer's right at any price between $50 and $100 will make
both parties better off. If instead of the farmer's having a right to be free from sparks the
railroad has a legal right to emit sparks, no transaction will occur. The farmer will not pay
more than $50 for the railroad's right and the railroad will not accept less than $100. Thus,
whichever way the legal right is assigned, the result, in terms of resource use, is the same: the
railroad emits sparks and the farmer moves his crops.
The principle is not affected by reversing the numbers. Assume that the right to emit sparks
would increase the value of the railroad's property by only $50 but would reduce the value of
the farmer's property by $100. If the railroad has a right to emit sparks, the farmer will offer
to pay and the railroad will accept some price between $50 and $100 for the surrender of the
railroad's right. If instead the farmer has a right to be free from emissions, there will be no
transaction since the farmer will insist on a minimum payment of $100 while the railroad will
pay no more than $50.
Whatever the relative values of the competing uses, it seems that the initial assignment of
legal rights does not determine which use ultimately prevails. The efficient value-maximizing
Yale Journal on Regulation
The Coase theorem implies that less direct government regulation is
needed than had been previously thought. That is, a redefinition of prop-
erty rights may solve some externality problems without requiring regula-
tory intervention in the marketplace."7 The major problem in applying the
Coase theorem to actual policy decisions is that it assumes the absence of
transaction costs. When transaction costs are present, the initial allocation
of property rights is often determinative of the outcome, and therefore
government regulatory intervention beyond the mere definition of property
rights may be necessary.
In such circumstances, Congress' traditional response has been to create
a regulatory body endowed with the right to enjoin activities, assess fines,
or impose criminal sanctions-that is, to allocate property rights directly.
This traditional approach, however, does not necessarily promote efficient
outcomes. The concentration of enforcement authority in a single body
permits the reallocation of a property right (in clean air, for example)
where such reallocation could promote social welfare but would not other-
wise be achieved because of high transaction costs. Unfortunately, there is
no reason to believe that the allocation chosen will be socially optimal,
because government enforcers lack incentives to regulate efficiently.
Evolutionary theories of law suggest an alternative to regulation by
government administrative agencies." The evolutionary argument sug-
gests that efficient laws will develop if the parties to disputes are chosen
correctly. In particular, if two opposing parties have ongoing economic
interests in the type of case being contested, and if they have the same
accomodation of the conflict will be adopted whichever party is granted the legal right to
exclude interference by the other.
Id. at 34-35 (footnote omitted).
37. See id. at 271.
38. In general, evolutionary models of law have focused on common law, suggesting that the
observed efficiency of common law results from the evolutionary effect of the tendency of inefficient
common law precedents to be litigated and overturned more frequently than efficient precedents.
Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 259 (1979); Priest, The
Common Law Processes and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 66 (1977); Rubin,
Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). In all of these models, common law
is driven to efficiency "by the decisions of litigants, and efficiency is achieved if and only if litigants
represent the set of future potential parties to disputes involving the rule under consideration." Rubin,
Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206 (1982).
Whereas Posner and others seem to believe that evolutionary theories apply only to common law,
Gordon Tullock has argued that special interest groups and their spending on lobbying for or against
statutes are analogues of litigants and their spending on litigation to attack or defend a common law
rule. G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1980). Thus, if
spending on litigation drives the common law toward efficiency, spending on lobbying should drive
statute law toward efficiency as well. Id. at 198. In previous works, one author of this article hypothe-
sized that the failure of statute law to evolve efficiently results from the fact that the wrong types of
participants are involved in the development of statute law and related rules. See Common Law and
Statute Law, supra, at 211. See generally P. RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW
(1983). This article proposes a system of statutory and regulatory development in which the parties
will be endowed with the correct interests.
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stakes in the case that future disputants are likely to have, then there will
be pressure on both parties to develop efficiency-promoting rules to resolve
their disputes."9 Conversely, if both parties to a dispute have an interest
only in the case at hand, but no ongoing interest in similar cases, there
will be no pressure for efficiency.40
Government enforcement agents have ongoing interests in enforcing
public policy, but these interests are not necessarily related to the eco-
nomic costs and benefits of enforcement. For example, when Congress
decides on a goal of reducing traffic deaths, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) will not necessarily seek the least expen-
sive means to enforce Congress' policy. On an institutional level it matters
little to NHTSA that one method may save lives at a cost of $1 million
per life saved and another at a cost of $10 million per life saved. If choos-
ing the more expensive method will require substantial monitoring efforts
and hence be budget maximizing, or will aid some of the agency's constit-
uent groups and hence be political support maximizing, the agency has
incentives not to choose the socially efficient method of regulation.4 a Only
if the enforcement agency's compensation depends on the net social bene-
fits of its action can we expect efficient rules to develop.
39. This occurs because inefficient rules are more likely to be litigated until overturned, and effi-
cient rules are less likely to be challenged. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, supra note 38,
at 53. For example, where two insurance companies confront each other in an automobile accident
case, the prerequisites for efficient evolution of law exist. There is indirect evidence that the set of
rules which has evolved in such cases is efficient. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49
(1982). Landes finds that states with no-fault insurance have higher accident rates and numbers of
claims. Thus, the best alternative to the common law solution to accident liability is less efficient than
the common law. See also P. RuBsN, supra note 38, at 5-7.
40. If one party does have an ongoing interest in the type of case under dispute and the other
party has no such interest, there will be pressure for the law to evolve so as to favor the party with the
continuing interest, independent of the efficiency of this outcome. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, supra note 38, at 55-56.
41. In recognition of this problem, President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,291 established
procedures requiring that regulatory agencies consider the costs and benefits of every proposed rule.
The Order provided that-to the extent permitted by law-"[regulatory actions shall not be under-
taken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society."
Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982), supplemented by Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50
Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985). Executive Order No. 12,291 also gives the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) the authority to review cost-benefit analyses conducted by regulatory agencies. Id. at §§ 3, 6.
Executive Order 12,291 sought to make rules more efficient by adding a layer of independent gov-
ernment oversight. It could not, however, duplicate the incentives and discipline of the market and
thus cannot ensure that agencies will conduct cost-benefit analyses correctly. First, the OMB staff is
very small in comparison to the regulatory agencies. Second, because the agencies control to some
extent the flow of information to OMB, they can reduce the accuracy of OMB's oversight. Third,
although OMB and the agencies do not share the same incentives (for example, an agency's desire to
maximize its budget is likely to carry little weight at OMB), OMB is itself a bureaucracy; it thus does
not necessarily have the proper incentives to-reulate efficiently, and its oversight may in part be based
on political rather than economic considerations.-For a discussion of Executive Order No. 12,291, see
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Decision-Making: An Analysis of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23
ARIZ. L. REV. 1195 (1981).
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Related to the problem posed by the lack of bureaucratic incentives for
efficient policy implementation is the problem engendered by the policy-
makers' relatively high monitoring costs. Suppose Congress decides to for-
bid pollution. The polluter has no economic incentive to cease polluting
unless the enforcement agent monitors and penalizes the emission of pol-
lutants. The government enforcement agency, however, may lack the
incentive to monitor the firm effectively. Congress must therefore monitor
the government enforcement agency through oversight and appropriations
hearings to ensure that the agency is carrying out its congressional man-
date.42 If, however, Congress were to create private enforcement agents
whose economic interests were directly related to the social costs and bene-
fits of their actions, the goals of the policy would be "privately enforcea-
ble." An institution will be said to be privately enforceable when it
includes mechanisms that make it in the self-interest of enforcement
agents to perform according to the desires of the policymaker. That is, the
enforcer's costs and benefits parallel society's costs and benefits, so that by
maximizing its own self-interest, the enforcer will also maximize the in-
terest of the policymaker. Since the enforcement agent, in maximizing its
own self-interest also maximizes the interest of the government, there is
little need for the government to monitor the enforcement agent's perform-
ance directly.
43
Under our current regulatory system, government enforcement agents
have ongoing interests in public policy enforcement, a prerequisite for the
evolution of efficient rules governing implementation. These interests,
however, are not necessarily related to the costs and benefits associated
with implementing policies. Efficiency gains can be realized by creating
private enforcement agents endowed with a property right in the enforce-
ment of public policy. Under this proposal for private enforcement, these
agents would have ongoing economic interests directly related to the costs
and benefits of implementation of public policy, thus permitting the evolu-
tion of efficient rules governing regulatory policy implementation. The
remainder of this section describes two possible applications of this propo-
sal for private enforcement of public policy.
44
42. See generally L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979);
and B. ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 31-135 (1982).
43. Indirect monitoring of aggregate statistics will, however, be required. See infra notes 75-81
and accompanying text.
44. Several other possible examples of how this proposed system of private enforcement of public
policy might be applied are discussed in an earlier version of this article. Cohen & Rubin, Enforcing
Government Policy: The Evolution of Efficient Regulation (Working Paper No. 131, Bureau of Eco-
nomics, Federal Trade Commission).
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B. Automobile Safety
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 1 sets forth
a policy whereby new automobiles are to be manufactured "to reduce
accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic acci-
dents."" The Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue motor
vehicle safety performance standards consistent with this goal. The Secre-
tary must take into account relevant motor vehicle safety research data
and consider whether the standard is "reasonable, practicable and
appropriate.
4 7
NHTSA currently implements this policy by requiring new
automobiles to be manufactured in compliance with various safety stan-
dards. Although NHTSA considers the costs and benefits of mandating
new safety standards,48 there is no mechanism to ensure that this analysis
is done correctly. For example, in the case of air bags,49 NHTSA's analy-
sis failed to take into account the private demand for safety, the fact that
drivers forced to buy air bags may reduce their demand for other forms of
safety. For example, if drivers use less care in driving as a result of man-
dated safety, an increase in deaths and injuries to other drivers will
result.60 A traditional response to this problem would be a call for govern-
ment regulators to be more careful in doing their cost-benefit analysis. 1
Unfortunately, even if the cost-benefit analysis is done correctly, there is
no guarantee that the efficient solution will be chosen and implemented by
45. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982)).
46. Id. at § 1381.
47. Id. at § 1392(0.
48. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 requires the issuance of perform-
ance standards rather than specific equipment-based standards. There is no provision for a cost-bene-
fit analysis. However, NHTSA has conducted economic analyses of proposed safety standards since
the early 1970's. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, BENEFIT AND COST
ANALYSIS OF METHODOLOGY (1972). See Nash, Passive Restraints: A Regulator's View, in THE
SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 53 (1981).
49. NHTSA first imposed an automatic crash protection standard in 1977. The standard requires
that front-seat occupants must be automatically protected in frontal collisions at speeds up to thirty
miles per hour. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Restraint Systems, 42 Fed. Reg.
34,289-305 (1977). Although manufacturers are free to use any system to achieve compliance with the
NHTSA performance standard, air bags have emerged as a leading alternative. The deadline for full
compliance with these performance standards has been extended to September 1, 1989, and compli-
ance will not be required if two-thirds of the population are covered by mandatory seat belt use laws
by that date. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984).
50. Blomquist & Peltzman, Passive Restraints: An Economist's View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS
OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION, supra note 48, at 41-42.
51. This is one suggestion offered by Blomquist & Peltzman, id. at 51. They also suggest the
adoption of financial incentives for safe driving. Id.. We have ignored these suggestions for the pur-
poses of the following example. However, even if the policy advocated by Blomquist and Peltzman
were shown to be superior to a policy directed toward automobile manufacturers, the government's
role should nevertheless be limited to determining the values to be placed on reduced injuries and
deaths. A private enforcement agent could best determine the structure of financial incentives and
rules needed to implement such a program efficiently.
Yale Journal on Regulation
government regulators. No mechanism penalizes the government regulator
for wrong or inefficient decisions. In contrast, a program of private
enforcement of government policies would attempt to use the discipline of
the market to ensure efficient regulatory decisions.
Under a system of private enforcement of public policy, the roles of
Congress and NHTSA in auto safety would be completely revamped.
Congress would simply place a dollar value on the social costs of traffic
injuries and deaths.5" NHTSA would determine the current mortality and
morbidity rates caused by automobile accidents, controlling for such vari-
ables as number of miles driven and average age of driver, but could not
promulgate or enforce safety standards. Finally, the government would
auction off the right to enforce automobile safety regulations to an
enforcement agent in the private sector. Under this scheme, the govern-
ment would pay the high bidder in the auction an amount equal to the
social benefit of any reduction of traffic injuries and deaths from the base-
line s level due to the agent's enforcement efforts and would collect from it
correspondingly for any increase. The government's role is to establish the
baseline level of injuries and deaths and the social value per life and per
injury, to collect aggregate statistics, and to make payments to, or receive
payments from, the enforcement agent. The government could not enforce
regulations itself nor compel the enforcer to do so.
The private enforcement agent would have the freedom to accept any
level of compliance from automobile manufacturers with the baseline stan-
dard of accidents or deaths. It would have the power to take any automo-
bile manufacturer to court to ensure compliance with the current safety
standards, just as NHTSA currently can,54 but the private enforcer could
not force manufacturers to go beyond current safety standards. If the
enforcement agent believes that some new safety standard will generate
payments that exceed the total social cost of achieving the standard, it will
be in the enforcer's own interest to pay automobile manufacturers to abide
by the standard. Similarly, if the enforcer offers an amount greater than
the manufacturers' own costs of satisfying the standard, it will be in the
52. For a survey of the literature addressing the problem of placing economic values on life and
safety, see M. JONES-LEE, THE VALUE OF LIFE (1976). Studies have estimated the value of life as
ranging from $500,000 to $4,000,000. W. Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 101 (1983).
53. For the purposes of this example, the baseline level of safety is defined as the level of safety
mandated by regulations in place at the time the private enforcement agent is created. However, there
is no logical requirement that the baseline be set at the current level of safety; it might alternatively be
set above or below the current level. The choice of the baseline will determine the property right held
by the enforcement agent and thus will have distributional consequences. See supra note 35.
54. NHTSA's authority to enforce its automobile safety regulations is codified at 49 U.S.C. §
105(c) (1982).
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manufacturers' own interests to agree to comply with the standard."'
Under this private enforcement program, the enforcer and automobile
manufacturer would find it in their mutual interest to agree to achieve a
safety level different from the baseline or to install a new safety device if it
is socially efficient to do so. There would be no need for the enforcement
agent to command the automobile manufacturer to improve safety.
To illustrate how this enforcement scheme would work, consider the
problem of an enforcement agent that must decide whether to propose
adoption of a newly developed safety device. Let p be the dollar value the
government has decided to pay per life saved. Suppose that there are cur-
rently Ao accidents that cause fatalities but that the new device would
reduce fatalities to A,. Finally, suppose that the device would cost auto-
mobile manufacturers C, to install and would cost the enforcement agent
M, to ensure it is installed as agreed upon by the parties. The enforce-
ment agent's expected net income, I,, from implementing this proposal
would be:
p(A0 - A1) - Ml - C1 = 11
p = price per life saved
A0 = current accident level
A1 = accident level with new device
Ml monitoring cost
C1 = installation cost
I, enforcer's net income.
That is, if the enforcement agent could convince automobile manufactur-
ers to incorporate the new safety device, it would expect to receive a
55. In this simple example, all automobile manufacturers were assumed to be identical. It is quite
likely, however, that manufacturers differ in their propensity to produce safe cars. It is not just that
some auto makers are better than others at producing safe cars. Automobiles are composite goods with
various attributes such as performance, comfort, safety, and fuel economy. Technological and eco-
nomic constraints are such that these attributes often must be traded off. See Lave, Conflicting Objec-
tives in Regulating the Automobile, SCIENCE, May 22, 1981, at 893.
Firms that have a comparative advantage in producing safe automobiles may be paid to provide a
greater level of safety than those that are less efficient in producing safety. An automobile manufac-
turer that is asked to provide more than the baseline amount of safety will be fully compensated by
the enforcement agent. Since it is socially beneficial to have this company increase its safety expendi-
tures, the payment from the government to the enforcement agent for reduced fatalities due to this
company's increased safety will more than offset the cost of the additional safety related expenditures.
Conversely, a firm whose cost of obtaining the current level of safety exceeds the social benefit of
obtaining that level may desire to reduce its safety level. That firm will have to pay the enforcement
agent an amount equal to the reduced social benefits. Because the social benefit is less than the firm's
cost savings, this automobile manufacturer will be able to stop producing that socially inefficient level
of safety and compensate the enforcement agent for its reduced revenue. It is in the interest of the
enforcement agent to accept this proposed change. Although the enforcement agent will have to pay
the government (or receive less compensation from the government for its other safety enhancing
activities) an amount equal to the social cost of the decrease in safety, the enforcement agent will
receive an amount at least as large as this from the automobile manufacturer.
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payment from the government equal to the social benefit of the reduced
fatality rate, p(A0 - A,). This incremental income would be offset by the
added administrative expenses the enforcer would incur in monitoring
compliance, M,, and the cost of persuading automobile manufacturers to
adopt the device, Cr."
Given the above notation, a proposed safety device is socially beneficial
if 1 > 0; that is, if the expected social benefit of the reduction in fatalities
less the monitoring cost exceeds the cost of obtaining that reduced fatality
rate. The incentives created by this enforcement scheme are such that if
the device is socially beneficial, the private enforcer will be able to pay
automobile manufacturers enough to secure the voluntary installation of
the new safety device. However, if a device is socially inefficient (that is,
Il < 0), then the increment to the enforcer's income resulting from the
potential saving of lives, p(A0 - A,), will be less than the incremental cost
of the new safety device, C,, plus the cost of monitoring compliance, MI,
and the enforcer will be unable to offer automobile manufacturers enough
money to induce them to install the new device.
As another example, suppose some current safety standard is socially
inefficient. A government enforcer might have little incentive to drop this
inefficient standard. However, under a system of private enforcement, reg-
ulated industries will "bribe" the enforcement agent not to enforce ineffi-
cient standards. The automobile manufacturers would be willing to pay
an amount up to the cost of the currently mandated safety device, C2, in
order to avoid compliance with the standard. If the enforcement agent
were to stop enforcing a standard and traffic deaths were to rise concomi-
tantly from A0 to A 2, the enforcement agent would lose p(A2 - Ao). Since
there would be one less standard to enforce, the enforcement agent could
eliminate that portion of its monitoring of automobile manufacturers that
is devoted to ensuring compliance with that safety standard; this would
result in a savings to the enforcement agent of M2. Thus, the net income
realized by the enforcement agent if it permits this relaxation of safety is:
56. C is the minimum cost of persuading automobile manufacturers to install the new device.
Automobile manufacturers will likely be able to command some return on their investment in automo-
bile safety and thus receive some payment greater than Cr. Accordingly, the enforcer's expected in-
come will actually be less than I r I should thus be thought of as the expected income that is availa-
ble to be divided between automobile manufacturers and the enforcement agent.
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C2 + M 2 - p(A 2 - Ao) = 12
C 2  - installation cost
M2 = monitoring cost
p = price per life saved
A 2 = accident level without enforcement
A0 = current accident level
12 = enforcer's net income.
In order for the enforcer to be willing to relax safety standards, the incre-
ment to its income, 12, must be greater than zero. Note, however, that
where a device is socially inefficient, 12-by definition-will be greater
than zero, and the agent will not enforce the standard. Conversely, the
enforcement agent will not relax a socially efficient standard, because such
non-enforcement will reduce its net income. The enforcement agent's
profit thus reflects the social net benefit of its enforcement decisions, and
the agent will have the proper incentives to regulate efficiently.5 8
C. Pollution Control
Proposed alternatives to the current regulatory approach to limiting
environmental pollution have included emission fees59 and marketable pol-
lution rights. 0 Such proposals have generally focused on the relative mer-
its of these policies as alternatives to current regulatory efforts," and little
attention has been paid to the optimal form of enforcement of these
57. A standard is socially inefficient if the value of the lives saved by using the device,
p(A2 - Ad, is less than the cost to manufacturers of compliance with the standard plus the cost to the
enforcer of monitoring compliance; that is p(A - Ad < C, + M 2. Rearranging the terms, where a
standard is socially inefficient, C2 + M 2 + pAo - A) will be greater than zero.
58. It is important to distinguish this proposal from a system in which the government deals
directly with the regulated industry. For example, one could have proposed that Congress directly
compensate automobile manufacturers for reduced fatalities. However, since there are many automo-
bile manufacturers, it would be difficult to allocate properly the payments to those responsible for the
reduced fatalities. Alternatively, one could also have proposed that NHTSA implement this policy by
offering to pay any auto maker p dollars per expected life saved as a result of any safety device
installed. The problem with this approach is that there is no guarantee that the government enforcer
will evaluate the proposed safety device from the perspective of social cost-benefit criteria. For exam-
ple, a budget maximizing bureaucrat may require an enormous (and inefficient) amount of test data,
since he would have to hire additional technical staff to evaluate each proposed safety device. On the
other hand, the private enforcer would only require additional tests if it is socially efficient to do so,
since its compensation depends on net social benefits.
It might be argued that this proposal could be replicated with public officials by "relabeling" the
private enforcer a "public" official. However, this public official would not look like the public ser-
vants we know today. For example, the enforcer would not be constrained by civil service protections
and administrative procedures. Thus, he would be a "public" enforcer in name only.
59. See W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 4, at 246-50, 255-67; A. KNEESE & B. BOWER,
MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMIcs, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 131-72 (1968).
60. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 172-190
(1975) (evaluation of the merits of taxes and subsidies as alternative methods of regulating
externalities).
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market-based policies.6 2  Under a conventional, government-enforced
emission fee scheme, a government regulatory agency monitors polluters
and collects a tax or a fee from each based on a variable schedule, derived
from estimates of the social cost of emissions. Suppose instead that the
government sells the right to collect emission fees to a private enforcement
agent. This enforcement agent would be endowed with an appropriate
economic interest in collecting taxes. Since bidding for the right to collect
taxes is competitive, the contract will go to the firm that is able to pay the
largest amount, collect the fines, and still earn a profit. Assuming competi-
tive bidding by expected profit maximizing firms, this will be by definition
the firm that is able to monitor and collect emission fees in the least costly
manner. Moreover, there will be additional benefits due to the evolution
of efficient rules used to implement this emission fee scheme.
Under a private enforcement scheme, the enforcement agent would have
the right to collect a fee from each polluter based on the polluter's level of
emissions. As in the automobile safety example, the government would
pay the enforcer an amount equal to the social value of any reduction in
pollution from the baseline level of pollution,"' and the enforcer would
likewise pay the government an amount equal to the social cost of any
increase in pollution emitted above the baseline level."4 For a given level
62. The economics literature on pollution control has not generally focused on monitoring and
enforcement of environmental regulation. But see Epple & Visscher, supra note 33 (estimating a
model of firm behavior in the case of oil transport vessels); Harford, Firm Behavior Under Imper-
fectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes, 5 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 26 (1978) (exam-
ining the problem of a firm subject to imperfect monitoring); Cohen, The Costs and Benefits of Oil
Spill Prevention and Enforcement, J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. (forthcoming) (estimating the costs
and benefits of Coast Guard enforcement of oil spill regulations). Roland McKean has noted the
difficulty of enforcing environmental and safety regulations and urges policymakers to take into
account enforcement costs and the fact that firms may devote resources to avoid detection. He also
cautions that the incentives of enforcement agencies will vary a great deal from case to case. McKean,
Enforcement Costs in Environmental and Safety Regulation, 6 POL'Y ANALYSIS 269 (1980). For a
formalized treatment of some of these ideas, see Lee, The Economics of Enforcing Pollution Taxation,
11 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 147 (1984); Lee, Monitoring and Budget Maximization in the Con-
trol of Pollution, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 565 (1983).
63. As in the automobile safety example, the baseline level of pollution is assumed for the pur-
poses of this example to be the level prevailing at the time the private enforcement agent is created.
See supra note 53. However, Congress may exercise its discretion in choosing an appropriate baseline
level of pollution. The baseline level, while not a property right in the sense that the baseline level of
automobile safety is (because the enforcer cannot command compliance with it), will determine the
size and direction of payments made between the government and the enforcement agent.
64. This system of transfer payments between the government and the enforcer is necessary to
preserve the enforcer's economic interest in achieving the socially optimal level of pollution. Without
these transfers, the enforcer's interests would be skewed toward preferring too much pollution. Sup-
pose that the enforcer were simply given the right to collect fines in the amount of $1000 per unit of
pollution but was not compensated for abatement. Suppose also that a polluter can abate at a cost of
$500 per unit of pollution. While it is clearly efficient for the polluter to abate, the enforcer and
polluter will have an incentive to collude. For example, if the polluter ordinarily emits ten units of
pollution but is driven to eliminate all emissions by the threat of a $10,000 fine, it would expend a
total of $5000 for abatement. The enforcer, on the other hand, would collect no fines and might incur
Private Enforcement
of monitoring, the enforcer's total revenues would remain constant,
regardless of the amount of pollution emitted, at an amount equal to the
baseline level of pollution multiplied by the tax imposed per unit of pollu-
tion. Its profits will thus be determined by the cost-effectiveness with
which it monitors individual polluters."
As noted above, the enforcement agent under this scenario will be indif-
ferent to the ultimate level of pollutants emitted. Polluters, however, will
not be. Because a polluter will be required to pay a fee for each unit of
pollution detected, it will have economic incentives to adjust pollution to
the point where the social cost of reducing pollution, as measured by the
cost of abatement plus the monitoring cost required to produce such abate-
ment, exactly equals the social benefit of that reduced pollution, as
reflected in the per-unit tax on pollution. Under a system of private en-
forcement, where t is the per-unit emission fee, P is the level of pollutants
detected by the enforcer, B is the baseline level of pollution, and C is the
per-unit cost of abating pollution, the polluter's total cost is equal to:
t(P) + C(B - P)
t per-unit tax on pollution
P - level of pollution detected by enforcer
C - per-unit cost of abating pollution
B = baseline level of pollution.
The enforcement agent will not be able to mandate a certain level of pol-
lution; each polluter will determine its own level based on its marginal
cost of abatement. Exclusive of the amount bid in order to become the
enforcement agent, the enforcer's net income is:
t(P) + t(B - P) - M = t(B) - M = I
t per-unit tax on pollution
P = level f pollution detected by enforcer
B = baseline level of pollution
M - monitoring cost
I = enforcer's net income.
The enforcer's income will equal the tax collected as a result of its moni-
toring and enforcement efforts, t(P), plus a payment to or from the
significant monitoring costs. Given such a potential outcome, both parties could profit by not enforcing
the scheme-the polluter by not abating and thus incurring the $10,000 fine, and the enforcer by not
monitoring and at the same time paying the polluter something over $5000, thus making it cheaper
for the polluter to pollute than to abate.
65. For simplicity, we have assumed the firm is unable to devote resources to avoid detection of
the pollution. Although this may be a reasonable assumption for some polluters, even if avoiding
detection is possible, it does not change the nature of the argument. For a formal analysis that takes
into account a firm's ability to devote resources to avoid detection, see Lee, The Economics of Enforc-
ing Pollution Taxation, supra note 62, at 154-58.
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government based on amount of pollution abated, t(B - P), minus monitor-
ing and enforcement costs, M. If P is lower than B, the enforcer will be
entitled to a payment from the government. If, however, P is higher than
B, the enforcer must pay the government for the cost of the increased
pollution.
Enforcement of such an emission fee scheme is socially efficient if the
value of abatement achieved, t(B - P), less the monitoring costs necessary
to bring about such a reduction in pollution, M, is greater than the cost of
achieving the reduction, C(B - P). Although a polluter would be willing to
offer up to t(P) + C(B - P) to the enforcer not to enforce the fee scheme,
this amount will be less than the enforcer's net income, I, when it is
socially efficient to reduce pollution by (B - P).66
The cost and effectiveness of the enforcer's monitoring methods deter-
mine its profits. Thus, the enforcer will have an incentive to develop effi-
cient monitoring devices-that is, to engage in monitoring only up to the
point where the marginal cost of monitoring is equal to the marginal ben-
efit of the fines collected. More important, rules will develop such that the
socially optimal level of pollution will actually be achieved.
To illustrate the dynamic process whereby private enforcement will
lead to efficient enforcement of public policy, suppose that the enforcer's
current monitoring technique' involves taking readings of polluters' emis-
sions once a week. Suppose also that the polluting firm is able to adjust its
pollution daily, thus reducing its emission .fees-at the expense of the
enforcer-by depressing emissions on days when the monitor is present.
Finally, suppose that the enforcement agent is considering adoption of a
new monitoring technique which would monitor emissions daily. The ini-
tial effect of this new and more accurate daily monitor will be to increase
the pollution observed, thus raising the polluter's fees. The polluter will
respond by increasing tax payments, reducing pollution, or both, any of
which raise the agent's revenues. The enforcer will seek to implement the
daily monitor if the sum of the additional fees and the increased govern-
ment compensation is greater than the increase in cost to the enforcer of
the daily monitor.
66. The polluter will be unwilling or unable to offer the enforcer enough compensation to aban-
don enforcement where
t(P) + C(B - P) < t(P) + t(B - P) - M
or, by cancelling terms, where
C(B - P) < t(B - P) - M.
If enforcement of this level of abatement is socially beneficial, C(B - P) by definition will be less than
t(B - P) - M.
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Using the above notation, let Pw, be the level of pollution currently
detected using the weekly monitor, let P, be the level of pollution cur-
rently being emitted which could be detected with the daily monitor, and
let Pd be the level of pollution which would actually be detected using the
daily monitor, given that polluters may increase abatement in response to
implementation of the daily monitor. In addition, let M w be the monitor-
ing cost associated with the weekly monitor and let Md be the monitoring
cost associated with the daily monitor. Adoption of the daily monitor will
be attractive to the enforcement agent if:
t(PC " P) > (Md - Mw)
t = per-unit tax on pollution
PC current level detectable with daily monitor
Pw= current level detected with weekly monitor
Md - monitoring cost with daily monitor
Mw - monitoring cost with weekly monitor.
If the additional increment to income resulting from the increased detec-
tion of pollution is greater than the additional monitoring costs incurred
as a result of adopting the daily monitor, the enforcer will desire to under-
take the new monitor.
On the other hand, implementation of the daily monitor will also add to
the costs borne by polluting firms. The adoption of the new monitoring
technique will cost the polluting firm an additional amount equal to:
t(Pd - Pw) + C(Pc - ed)
t = per-unit tax on pollution
Pd level actually detected with daily monitor
Pw current level detected with weekly monitor
C - per-unit cost of abating pollution
PC= current level detectable with daily monitor.
The first term in the above equation represents the additional emission
fees paid because of the more effective monitoring; the second represents
additional abatement expenses incurred as a result of the new monitor.
For each unit of additional pollution detected by the new daily monitor,
the polluter will decide whether paying the emission fee or abating is
cheaper.
After determining its desired level of pollution and abatement under the
daily monitor, the polluting firm will face another decision: whether to
abate to the reduced level and/or pay additional taxes, or to pay the
enforcement agent not to implement the new monitoring method. If the
increased expense to the polluter resulting from the enforcer's use of the
daily monitor is greater than the gains accruing to the enforcer from
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additional pollution tax revenues and government payments, less monitor-
ing costs, the polluting firm will be able to pay the enforcer not to under-
take the new monitoring technique. Conversely, if the polluter's increased
cost is smaller than the enforcer's incremental gain, the polluter will be
unable to pay the enforcer not to implement the daily monitor.
The daily monitor will be socially efficient if its social benefits exceed
its social costs, or:
t(Pc - Pd) > C(Pc - Pd) + (Md - Mw)
t = per-unit tax on pollution
PC = current level detectable with daily monitor
Pd = level actually detected with daily monitor
C = per-unit cost of abatement
Md = monitoring cost with daily monitor
Mw = monitoring cost with weekly monitor.
Thus, where the new daily monitor is socially inefficient, polluters will be
able to pay the enforcer not to implement it, and where the new monitor
is socially efficient, they will be unable to afford to do so. Jointly, then,
the polluting firms and the enforcement agent will maximize net social
benefits.
67
Unlike the incentives motivating the private enforcement agent, those
motivating a governmental enforcer do not result in socially efficient
implementation of public policy. Using the above example, a governmen-
tal agent might proceed with implementation of a daily monitor despite
the fact that the additional fines collected as a result of using the daily
monitor do not justify the cost of the new technique, because implement-
ing the daily monitor may require a larger agency budget. Not only does
this lead to a waste of monitoring resources, but it may also result in more
or less pollution being emitted than is socially optimal. Under a system of
private enforcement of public policy, on the other hand, if the net social
costs of an alternative enforcement technique outweigh its benefits, the
private enforcement agent will have no incentive to adopt the new
technique.
III. Efficiency Gains from Private Enforcement
The previous examples demonstrate how private enforcement of public
policy results in social efficiency gains. These gains derive from three
67. To see this, note that the new monitor will cost the firm t(Pd - Pu) + C(PC - Pd) and will
result in increased income to the enforcer of t(P, - Pu) - (Md - Mu). Subtracting the firm's costs from
the enforcer's gains yields t(P c - Pd) - C(Pc - Pd) - (Md - Mu), which is precisely the net social
benefit of the new daily monitor.
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sources: the private nature of the enforcement organization,"' the use of a
market based incentive scheme, and the evolution of efficient rules of
implementation." This section describes and distinguishes between those
efficiency gains which can accrue from market-based schemes generally
and those which can be realized only by allowing private parties to deter-
mine the rules under which public policy will be enforced.
A. Gains From Market-Based Policy
Some of the efficiency benefits described in the automobile safety and
pollution control examples could be achieved regardless of whether the
government or a private agent implemented these policies. For example,
in the case of automobile safety, there are two significant efficiency gains
that would be realized even under government enforcement. First, the
government would require much less information than it does under the
current regulatory framework, since it need only estimate the social bene-
fits of avoiding each injury or preventing each death. This "market for
safety" would determine the optimal level of investment in automobile
safety devices. Thus, the government would have no need for the enor-
mous volume of technical and economic data required under the current
command and control approach to automobile safety regulation.
7 0
68. Private firms are generally more efficient than government agencies or public firms. For a
survey of the relevant literature, see DeAlessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the
Evidence, 2 RESEARCH L. & ECON. 1, 27-40 (1980). Profit maximizing firms have incentives to
reduce monitoring costs, without necessarily decreasing monitoring ability, by developing new
technologies, bargaining for cheaper labor, or eliminating unproductive employee or management
practices. The incentives for a budget-maximizing bureaucrat, however, are just the opposite. For
example, significant savings may result from replacing most of NHTSA's employees with employees
of the private enforcement firm. Unproductive employees would not have the employment guarantees
currently afforded to most government workers. Moreover, the private firm will not be burdened by
the administrative procedures that guide government agencies. For example, under the Administrative
Procedure Act, if an agency intends to make a new rule or amend an existing rule, it must issue an
advance notice of the proposal and give the public an opportunity to comment. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c)
(1982). These and other procedural requirements make the rulemaking process extremely burdensome
and inefficient.
69. Although the maximum efficiency gain from a private enforcement system is obtained when
efficient policies are implemented, efficiency gains due to the private nature of the enforcement agent
and the evolution of efficient rules of implementation would accrue even if the government policy to be
implemented were socially inefficient. For example, the government may decide for political or equity
reasons to exempt certain industries from pollution control requirements. Alternatively, the govern-
ment may decide on a level of auto safety that is "too safe," in the sense that the marginal social cost
of reducing the fatality rate far exceeds the social benefit. Private enforcement of these inefficient
policies will still produce social benefits, assuming the goal is to implement that policy in the least
expensive manner. Of course, to the extent that private enforcers can be expected to achieve a higher
level of compliance than government enforcers, one might argue that this is an undesirable means of
enforcing inefficient policies, since less compliance is preferred. The claim that inefficient policies
should be enforced by private agents is based on the assumption that policymakers prefer, for
whatever reason, more compliance. It is also possible that the social benefits of more efficient imple-
mentation may outweigh the social cost of increased compliance.
70. This is an important advantage over current regulatory schemes. Government regulators do
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Second, a market-based scheme, whether enforced by the government or
a private firm, is well suited both to adapt to changing technologies and to
foster research into improved safety technology. Under the current regula-
tory environment, NHTSA may require a new performance standard if it
determines it is technologically feasible. However, because automobile
manufacturers will have to increase production costs to implement a more
stringent standard, there is no incentive for automobile manufacturers to
develop these new technologies themselves.7 1 Under a market-based
approach, on the other hand, automobile manufacturers would have
incentives to develop new, efficient safety devices, since they would be re-
imbursed for at least their full production costs by the enforcement agent.
B. Gains From Private Enforcement
Although governmentally enforced market-based schemes provide some
improvement over the current regulatory approach, important efficiency
gains in our proposal derive solely from the private nature of the enforce-
ment agent. Efficient implementation of a government policy by a private
enforcement agent can be expected for two reasons. First, the parties
involved in this private enforcement scheme have ongoing economic inter-
ests in the regulated activity. Thus, the parties are of the sort that are
not have access to automobile manufacturers' private information about the cost of installing proposed
safety devices. Further, under the current regulatory approach, automobile manufacturers are likely to
overstate the costs and understate the technical feasibility of safety devices. If the government regulator
wishes to set a "safety" tax, it does not need to know the cost of increased safety if there is only one
firm or if social damages are independent of the level of fatalities. However, if there are several firms
and social damages are dependent upon the level of safety, the government needs to know the cost of
achieving various safety levels in order to set the proper tax. Under a market-based system of regula-
tion, this informational asymmetry is irrelevant for determining the ultimate level of safety. Automo-
bile manufacturers will be paid to increase safety, and the amount the enforcement agent is willing to
pay depends on the benefits resulting from the device rather than its incurred costs. Of course, auto-
mobile manufacturers may still be able to exploit this informational asymmetry to extract the highest
possible compensation from the enforcement firm. In a previous paper, one author of this article
provides several examples where firms have apparently used their private information about regula-
tory compliance costs to their advantage. M. Cohen, Essays in the Economics of Information and
Environmental Regulation 32 (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
Various incentive schemes to overcome this informational asymmetry have been proposed. See, e.g.,
Collinge & Bailey, Optimal Quasi-Market Choice in the Presence of Pollution Externalities, 10 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 221 (1983) (quasi-market framework in which market forces choose effi-
ciently); Kwerel, To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control, 44 REV.
ECON. STUD. 595 (1977) (iixed effluent charge/license plan); Roberts & Spence, Effluent Charges
and Licenses Under Uncertainty, 5 J. PuB. ECON. 193 (1976) (use of licenses supplemented by an
effluent subsidy and a finite penalty). But since these transfer payments only occur when the device is
socially efficient, the exact amount of the payment will determine the relative wealth of automobile
manufacturers and enforcement agent, not social welfare.
71. Since NHTSA uses performance standards, manufacturers have incentives to develop cheaper
ways to achieve the same results. However, they have no incentive to find a technologically and eco-
nomically feasible way to achieve a higher safety level if doing so costs as much or more than achiev-
ing current safety levels.
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needed in order for rules of implementation to evolve efficiently."3 In dis-
putes, there will be automobile manufacturers or polluters, for example,
on one side and enforcement agents on the other. When government agen-
cies enforce market-based schemes, there is no market discipline to assure
that the enforcer conducts its analysis correctly or seeks the most efficient
means and level of monitoring. 3 A private enforcer, on the other hand,
will have the correct incentives to enable the evolution of efficient rules
governing the implementation of public policy, since its incentives are
purely economic and are structured to reflect the social costs and benefits
of implementation.
Second, efficient implementation will be privately enforceable in the
sense that the party with the responsibility for implementing public policy
has a strong financial incentive to do so when it is socially efficient, and an
equally strong incentive not to enforce such regulations when doing so is
socially inefficient. Government is therefore needed only to establish the
policy regarding automobile safety or air pollution, for example, by deter-
mining the baseline level of safety or pollution, placing a dollar value on
lives saved and reduced pollution, and auctioning off the right to enforce.
Once the right is sold, government need only monitor aggregate statistics,
such as highway mortality figures and ambient air quality, in order to
determine the amount and direction of the required transfer payment
between the government and the private enforcer.
IV. Private Enforcement of Public Policy in Practice
Private enforcement of public policy would result in a significant
change in the nature of government regulation. Although the theoretical
justification for private enforcement is sound, its implementation raises
two potential difficulties-the monitoring of enforcers and the cost of
administering the program."'
72. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
73. For example, NHTSA has specific test requirements to determine performance of vehicles in
avoiding injuries during a crash. Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, 49 C.F.R. § 572 (1984). Since
NHTSA has no inherent incentive to design test standards that are efficient, automobile manufactur-
ers have had to rely on costly litigation to stop the regulators from adopting test procedures that they
felt were inaccurate. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); and
Nash, supra note 48, at 57-60. Under a private enforcement system, the enforcer and automobile
manufacturers would jointly have incentives to design tests to yield results as close as possible to real
life crash conditions, since each firm's compensation is based upon actual reductions in human injuries
and deaths.
74. The automobile safety and pollution control examples outlined above are necessarily simpli-
fied to illustrate the nature of the benefits which are expected to result from private enforcement.
Before these proposals could be adopted, more detailed analyses would be needed to apply these ideas
to specific policy areas.
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A. Monitoring Enforcers
A private enforcement system creates a principal-agent relationship
between the government and the enforcement agent.7 5 As with any con-
tract, there must be some mechanism whereby the principal can determine
whether the agent has fulfilled the contract provisions.76 In this system of
private enforcement, the government must be able to monitor the enforcers
by evaluating aggregate performance-the total number of auto accidents
and injuries or aggregate pollution levels, for example-in order to deter-
mine the amount and direction of the necessary payment between the gov-
ernment and the enforcer.
If the government's monitoring is not effective, replacing government
enforcement with a system of private enforcement may create the risk of
collusion. For example, in the case of pollution control, the enforcer and
the polluting firm may be able to make higher joint profits by lying to the
government about the level of pollution abatement, which would result in
a higher level of pollution than is optimal. Thus, colluders would try to
extract more from the government than they are entitled while at the same
time reducing abatement costs.
However, a government enforcement agent is also prone to collusion.
Bribes and kickbacks are certainly not the exclusive domain of the private
sector. There is no reason to believe the problem would be any better or
worse with a private enforcement agent. Moreover, solutions such as per-
formance bonds, which have been proposed to minimize agency costs in
the government enforcement context," are equally applicable to a system
of private enforcement.
More importantly, the government can cheaply and effectively monitor
the enforcement agent and thus eliminate the risk of collusion by structur-
ing compensation so that it is based on easily observable data. The
75. For a discussion of the costs inherent in agency relationships, see Jensen & Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
76. Of course, this problem is not unique to our proposal-under the current regulatory scheme,
the executive departments and agencies are merely agents of Congress. To keep abreast of government
enforcement of public policy, standing House and Senate committees conduct investigations and spon-
sor legislation designed to minimize the costs of the agency relationship. See Niskanen, supra note 17
at 623-29; Weingast & Moran, supra note 23.
77. See Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1974). Becker and Stigler propose that police officers be required to post perform-
ance bonds against any malfeasance. By creating a penalty-in the form of forfeiture of the bond-for
shirking or malfeasance, the principal is effectively writing an incentive contract designed to mitigate
the informational asymmetry inherent in any agency relationship. See also Harris & Raviv, Some
Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance,
and Law Enforcement, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 20, 28-30 (1978) (applying principal-agent theory to the
compensation of law enforcement officials).
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government need not monitor the amount of resources devoted to enforce-
ment, or the level of compliance; its only concern is the aggregate level
of the social activity-such as pollution or automobile fatalities-being
regulated.78  Returning to the pollution tax proposal discussed
above,79 the government will base the amount of the transfer payment
between itself and the enforcement agent on exogenously measured ambi-
ent air quality. This monitoring need not be costly, since the government
must verify only a given jurisdiction's air quality, not the emissions level
of each firm. In the case of private enforcement of auto safety,80 the prob-
lem of monitoring the enforcement agent will similarly be insignificant,
since the data on which the transfer payment between the government and
the private enforcer is based, aggregate auto accident data, is readily veri-
fiable and in fact is already collected."'
B. Cost of the Program
This proposal may entail substantial governmental expenditures. In the
automobile safety example, the net result of private enforcement may be
that large payments would be made to automobile manufacturers in order
to induce them to increase the level of safety.82 If this occurred, there
would be a net transfer from taxpayers to automobile purchasers. These
transfer payments are, however, a feature of the market-based policies
generally; they are not unique to this proposal for private enforcement
agents.
Despite possible distributive effects, private enforcement of public pol-
icy would impose no net costs upon society. Someone must pay for safety.
Under the current regulatory approach, automobile manufacturers and,
indirectly, automobile buyers pay for safety features. Under the proposed
system of private enforcement, taxpayers rather than auto manufacturers
and buyers would pay for safety. This does not increase the total cost
78. With a risk neutral agent, the government need not observe the level of effort, only the final
outcome. Moreover, the government's measurement of outcomes need not be perfect. See Harris &
Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information, 20 J. ECON. THEORY 231, 233
(1979); Harris & Raviv, supra note 77.
79. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
81. Because of this monitoring problem, this proposal for private enforcement is more likely to
provide benefits over public enforcement when the government can base the enforcement agent's com-
pensation on easily observable aggregate data. The more difficult and/or costly it is to collect this
data, the less likely it is that this proposal will result in a significant improvement over public
enforcement.
82. This proposal will not necessarily require large transfer payments to the auto makers. The
magnitude and direction of payments will depend both on where the enforcement "baseline" is set and
on the value of life established by Congress. For example, if the baseline level of safety were set high
enough or the value of life low enough, there would be a transfer of wealth from automobile manufac-
turers to the enforcer or to the government.
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above that of the current system. In fact, to the extent the program
increases efficiency, the cost of achieving a given level of safety would
actually be reduced.
The risk associated with private enforcement may also impose costs on
the government. Those bidding for the right to become private enforce-
ment agents will demand a return on their investment commensurate with
the perceived riskiness of the enforcement venture. If private enforcement
is perceived as a particularly risky venture, bidders will demand high
expected returns,8" making the proposed enforcement scheme costly to tax-
payers. However, any new economic activity is risky. Once the market
adapts to the nature of the new activity, there is no reason to expect the
enforcers' required return to be any higher than that demanded for other
ventures of equivalent risk.84
Moreover, it must be remembered that moving an activity from the
public to the private sector does not increase its level of risk-the risk just
becomes more explicit. Promoting the explicit consideration of risk is actu-
ally a benefit rather than a disadvantage of this proposal, since govern-
ment enforcers do not have incentives to consider the risks associated with
the regulations they adopt. For example, if NHTSA believes some new
device may be able to achieve a new level of safety, it may mandate that
level of performance without considering the probability that it will be
impossible or prohibitively expensive to develop the device. There is no
incentive for the government enforcer to do further research before imple-
menting the new performance standard. If enforcement is made private,
on the other hand, the risk becomes explicit. If the expected benefit from
future research exceeds the expected cost of the research, the private
enforcer will not implement the new standard but will undertake the
research or pay the polluters or automobile manufacturers to do so.
Conclusion
Debate over government regulation has traditionally focused on the
nature of policies to be enacted. In practice, however, even efficient
83. With respect to auto safety, for example, the risks may be high if the enforcing firm must
offer large payments to automobile companies in order to induce them to undertake investment in
proposed new safety equipment where there is uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the new equip-
ment. If the expected reduction in accidents or fatalities does not occur, then the enforcement firm will
lose a substantial amount of money.
84. Just as a new product may be test marketed to reduce the risk of major losses, the enforcement
agent can be expected to test newly proposed safety devices to minimize start-up risk. Since auto
manufacturers have better information about the likelihood that safety devices will succeed in reducing
fatalities, it is natural for the auto companies to be asked to share this risk. In other words, the private
enforcer could be expected to shift some of the risk over to the auto companies by offering to pay a
premium for successful results and possibly pay less than the cost if they fail to meet expectations.
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policies do not often yield efficient results because they must be imple-
mented by government enforcement agents through a set of detailed rules
and enforcement procedures. Because government enforcers lack adequate
incentives to take into account the social costs and benefits of enforcement,
implementation of public policy by government enforcers has been
inefficient.
Efficient implementation of governmental policy can be achieved by
turning over the task of implementing public policy to private enforcement
agents imbued with economic incentives to regulate only where it is
socially efficient to do so.85 The advantages of moving from public to pri-
vate enforcement are threefold. First, private firms generally operate more
efficiently than public agencies. Second, because it is easier to choose par-
ties correctly than to choose efficient outcomes, an efficient result is more
likely to occur if the government concentrates on creating a property right
in a party which-unlike a government agency-will have appropriate
economic interests in efficient regulation. Third, and most important, if
private enforcement agents are created with appropriate incentives, evolu-
tionary forces will lead to efficient implementation of policy. 86
85. An intermediate step between public and private enforcement is the voluntary standards
organization, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). These associations establish
standards but have no direct enforcement power. Since they are concerned with both the cost of the
standard and the effects on industry-wide demand, there would be some pressure for efficiency. At
least one regulatory agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, relies heavily on such groups.
See Levinson, Voluntary Standards: Integral to CPSC Mission, Legal Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at 10,
col. 1.
86. This article offers normative policy prescriptions for overcoming many of the problems inher-
ent in regulation by government bureaucracies. However, there is no reason to believe that deci-
sionmakers desire socially efficient outcomes. Morris Fiorina, for example, argues that Congress
designs regulatory institutions to maximize their own visibility and usefulness in serving their constit-
uents, thus increasing the congressmen's chances of reelection. M. FIORINA, CONGRESS-KEYSTONE
OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 39-49 (1977). Congressmen, because they are able to
increase their political support by helping constituents through bureaucratic inefficiencies, may in fact
desire a bureaucracy which regulates inefficiently.

